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TRADE LAW OF NATIONS OR GLOBAL LAW ECONOMIC RELATIONS
A "FAIR" TRADE LAW OF NATIONS OR
A "FAIR" GLOBAL LAW OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS?
FRANK J. GARCIA*
This essay examines the dispute between advocates
of free trade and those who support fair trade (the
'fair" trade debate). This debate is explored in the
context of globalization. The author argues that
globalization has created, and continues to create, a
new global identity and global social relationships that
make 'justice" both possible and necessary. Such
relationships have findamental implications for the
nature of global social policy, particularly
international law and international trade law. The
author asserts that the fair trade debate presupposes
two independent contendingfoes: "'me" versus "you, "
and "mine " versus "theirs. "He argues, however, that
globalization has shifted the dialogue to one of "us"
and "ours. " Consequently, shared institutions are
employed to determine what is best for this shared
social space and disputing parties contribute to the
creation and definition of this social space. The
softwood lumber dispute is used to illustrate the
author's argument in that though parties to the dispute
pursue their own private agendas and public
mandates, they are also creating and defining a new
trans-border community. As such, the dispute does not
concern ensuring trade law is 'fair for the United
States or 'fair "for Canada; rather, the aim is a fair
settlementforan emerging trans-boundary community.
Cet article porte sur le diffdrend entre avocats du
libre-6change et ceux qui sont enfaveur du commerce
4quitable (le d~bat sur le commerce dquitable )). Ce
ddbat est examin dans un contexte de mondialisation.
L 'auteurfait valoir que la mondialisation a cr6e, et
continue de crier, une nouvelle entit mondiale et des
relations sociales globales qui rendent la (justice ) 6
la fois possible et ndcessaire. De telles relations ont
des implications fondamentales pour la nature de la
politique sociale mondiale, surtout le droit
international et le droit du commerce international.
L 'auteur affirme que le d~bat sur le commerce
6quitable prdsuppose lexistence de deux ennemis
ind~pendants qui s'affrontent: a moi contre ( vous o
et o le mien contre ( le leur ). Ilfait valoir cependant
que la mondialisation a modifW le dialogue vers
o nous ) et o le n6tre ). Par consequent, les
institutions partages cherchent 6 determiner ce qui
convient le mieux pour I 'espace social partag6, et les
parties au diffirend contribuent i la creation et
definition de cet espace social. Le diffrendsur le bois
d'ceuvre illustre 1 'argument de I 'auteur en ce sens que
mime si les parties 6 un differendcontinuent de suivre
leurs propres idles et mandats publics, elles creent et
d4finissent aussi une nouvelle communaute
transfrontalihre. A ce litre, le diffrend ne consistepas
6t veiller i ce que le commerce soit quitable ) pour
les Etats-Unis ou ( equitable ) pour le Canada, mais
plut6t 6 arriver ti une entente quitable pour la
communaut transfrontalikre mergente.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Our conference focuses on a particular international trade dispute - actually a series of
interrelated cases - known as the Softwood Lumber dispute, and the institutions we have
created to manage such disputes: international economic law, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Canada, the
Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States,' and national courts.' In
particular, we are being asked to consider how this dispute reflects, and contributes to, the
larger debate between those who advocate for free trade, and those who advocate for fair
trade.3 In this essay, I propose to offer the largest possible context I can in which to examine
this dispute and this question, and what they both mean for the evolution of these institutions:
that context is globalization.
17 December 1992, Can. T.S. 1994 No. 2, 32 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force I January 1994) [NAFTA].
2 See Chi Carmody, "Softwood Lumber Dispute (2001-2006)" (2006) 100 Am. J. Int'l L. 664. The WTO
eases considered are, in order: United States-Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain
Softwood Lumberfrom Canada (2002), WTO Doc.WT/DS236/R (Panel Report); United States-Final
Countervailing Duty Determination with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (2004),
WTO Doc. WT/DS257/AB/R (Appellate Body Report); United States-Final Dumping Determination
on Softwood Lumberfrom Canada (2004), WTO Doc. DS264/AB/R (Appellate Body Report); United
States-Investigation ofthe International Trade Commission in SoftwoodLumberfrom Canada (2004),
WT/DS277/R (Panel Report), all decisions available online: WTO <http://docsonline.wto.org/gen
search/asp>. The NAFTA eases considered are, in order: Re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada: Final AffirmativeAntidumpingDetermination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-02 (DOC), Decision of
the Panel (17 July 2003), Decision of the Panel Respecting Remand Redetermination (5 March 2004),
Decision of the Panel Following Remand (9 June 2005), Decision of the Panel Respecting Motions to
Dismiss (5 January 2007) (Ch. 19 Panel); Re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from Canada: Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-03 (DOC), Decision of the
Panel (13 August 2003), Decision of the Panel on Remand (7 June 2004), Decision of the Panel on
Second Remand (I December 2004), Decision of the Panel on Third Remand (23 May 2005), Decision
of the Panel on the Fourth Remand Determination (5 October 2005), Decision of the Panel on the Fifth
Remand Determination (17 March 2006) (Ch. 19 Panel); Re Certain Softwood Lumber Products from
Canada: Final Affirmative Threat of Material Injury Determination, USA-CDA-2002-1904-07 (ITC),
Decision of the Panel (5 September 2003), Remand Decision of the Panel (19 April 2004), Second
Remand Decision ofthe Panel (31 August 2004) (Ch. 19 Panel); Re Certain Sofnvood Lumber Products
from Canada, ECC-2004-1904-01 USA, Opinion and Order of the Extraordinary Challenge Committee
(10 August 2005) (ECC), all decisions available online: NAFTA Seeretariat <http:www.nafta-sec-
alena.org>.
For a recent eomprehensive overview of the notions of "fair" versus "free" trade in the context of the
Softwood Lumber dispute, see Gilbert Gagnd, "Policy Diversity, State Autonomy, and the U.S. -
Canada Softwood Lumber Dispute: Philosophical and Normative Aspects" (2007) 41 J. World Trade
699.
(2007) 45:2
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But first, a word about the question I pose in the title of this essay. Behind the debates
over free trade versus fair trade, is the general assumption that the object of the inquiry is the
fairness of any one state's position vis-A-vis another state. This is certainly a legitimate and
important inquiry. However, I think this debate also reflects a deeper underlying assumption
about the nature of trade law, economic relations, and global social relations generally. This
approach has been called the "society of states" model of international relations, and it has
been the dominant contemporary account of the social basis of international law for over
three hundred years.4 In this view, international law exists to order a community in which
states are the members.
This is where globalization comes in. The phenomenon of globalization has been widely
studied in recent years, and I will say more about it shortly. Let me just suggest at the outset
that as a social process in which space is essentially eliminated as a factor in social relations,5
globalization is altering the nature of global social relations. By lifting relationships out of
the strictly territorial and placing them into the "global" or meta-territorial, globalization is
subjectively altering our interpersonal experience, and shifting regulatory processes away
from the nation state. Both these changes are contributing towards the emergence of
something that could be called a global society, and perhaps even a global community.
The significance of globalization lies in its transformation and extension of social
interactions beyond national boundaries. Thus, globalization itself is creating the kinds of
social relationships at the global level that make justice both possible and necessary. This
shift has fundamental implications for the nature of global social policy, particularly
international law and international trade law, which brings me back to our subject today. The
"fair" trade debate presupposes two independent contending foes: a "me" versus a "you," a
"mine" versus a "theirs." If what I am suggesting about globalization is correct, then we are
moving beyond such terms, and towards a realm of"us" and "ours." When viewed in this
light, the Softwood Lumber dispute in fact demonstrates how we employ shared institutions
to help us determine what is best for our shared social space, and, in the process, contribute
to the creation and definition of that space.
II. BEYOND THE SOCIETY OF STATES
The dominant contemporary account of the social basis of international law has been the
"society of states" model.6 In this view, to the extent that international law constructs an
ordered social space (a claim contested since Hobbes if not before),7 it is a social space in
For an overview of the society of states model of international relations, superseding the earlier Realist
paradigm, see Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1979) at 67-123.
On globalization as interdependence without differentiation of time and space, see e.g. Anthony
Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) at 64; David
Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 1989) at 240.
6 For an overview of the society of states model of international relations, superseding earlier Realist
paradigm, see generally Beitz, supra note 4 at 67-123
In terms of equating international law with the law of nature, which is to say, no law at all but self
preservation, see e.g. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996) at 244.
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which states are the subjects. In other words, international law exists to order a community
in which states are the members.
This view of international law as regulating a society of states has two important
normative implications, both flowing from the model's core analogy of states to persons.
First, it asserts a strong view of state autonomy: like persons in domestic society, states in
international society are viewed as autonomous sources of moral ends, immune from external
interference.' Second, there is no principle of distributive justice to which states are subject;
they are presumed to be entitled to the resources they control.9 Taken together, this approach
is called the "morality of states" model of international justice."0
We can see the doctrinal impact of this approach in many key areas. For example, the core
doctrines of non-intervention, self-determination, and state responsibility treat the state as
the primary locus of autonomy, self-realization, and rights, and are thus framed largely in
view of the interests and needs of territorial states. Even international harms to individuals
have been traditionally understood within a framework of harm to a state's rights. In all
cases, the analogy between states and persons controls, and it is the state's liberty and rights
which are defined as primary subjects of the law."'
Pressure to shift away from this model began in earnest in the mid-20th century, through
human rights, international economic law, and the emergence of international civil society,
all of which render the society of states model increasingly deficient both empirically and
normatively. Criticisms of current international law and institutions point to the changing role
of the state, the emergence of new actors and networks, the lack of democratic participation
and legitimacy, the lack of distributive justice, and the lack of basic welfare rights and
security for all individuals.' 2 All this points to the limits of the model, but what is to replace
it?
Il1. GLOBALIZATION, GLOBAL SOCIETY, AND GLOBAL COMMUNITY
The dominant contemporary project reconfiguring international law at the theoretical level
emphasizes the fundamental moral status of individual persons, drawing on the work of
8 Beitz, supra note 4 at 65-66.
9 Beitz has analogized this to 19th century liberalism at the international level: "a belief in the liberty of
individual agents, with an indifference to the distributive outcomcs oftheir economic interaction" (ibid.
at 66).
10 Ibid.
To citejust one example ofthe doctrinal pre-eminence of this view, the society ofstates model underlies
the entire approach to international law taken in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States (1987). The Restatement asserts that "[ilnternational law is the law of the
international community of states" (at 16) and states are the "principal persons in international law" (at
70). All other entities with any personality (international organizations and natural persons themselves)
derive their personhood, and the extent of their legal rights in international law, from grants flowing
from the primary persons: states.
2 See Symposium: Globalization and Governance: The Prospects for Democracy (2003) 10 Ind. J. Global
Legal Stud.
(2007) 45:2ALBERTA LAW REVIEW
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Immanuel Kant and others, and goes by the name "cosmopolitanism."' 3 Such efforts,
however, run into a variety of theoretical problems, including important communitarian
objections to the possibility of global justice, on the ground that justice is a virtue within
political communities, not between them. 4 This objection fits well with the society of states
model, freezes us in a bi-polar "fair" trade debate, and helps keep the justice conversation
out of international law.
Globalization is, however, changing the nature of this debate. By effectively eliminating
both time and space as factors in social interaction, 5 globalization is changing the nature of
global social relations, and creating the basis for both society and community at the global
level. Viewed from the perspective of political theory, globalization is lifting relationships
out of the strictly territorial into the global or meta-territorial. 6 The political and legal
significance of this change is immediate and fundamental: as the space in which we conduct
our social relations changes, our manner of regulating those relations must change as well.
To be effective, regulatory decisions must increasingly involve parties at the meta-state level.
Globalization thus requires a fundamental re-examination of social regulation and
governance at the global level, leading to a system in which states may still have a pre-
eminent role, but not the only role.'7
For the purposes of this essay, it is necessary to understand how globalization is changing
the nature of social relations at the national and at the "global" levels, and paving the way
for global society, global community, and for global justice, even on communitarian terms. 8
This change has a fundamental impact on the possibilities open to international law, and on
the way we understand and manage disputes such as the Softwood Lumber dispute.
A. GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONDITIONS OF JUSTICE
First, as a threshold matter, it is important to understand how globalization is getting us
to "society" before we consider how it might be getting us to "community." In order to do
this in a preliminary fashion, I will use John Rawls's concept of the circumstances ofjustice,
and apply it to globalization.
13 For a survey of contemporary cosmopolitanism, see generally Charles R. Beitz, "Cosmopolitan
Liberalism and the States System" in Chris Brown, ed., Political Restructuring in Europe: Ethical
Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1994) 123.
14 For gencral communitarian objections to global justice, see generally David Miller, On Nationality
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); Michael Walzer, Spheres ofJustice (New York: Basie Books, 1983).
15 For a comprehensive overview from a legal perspective ofglobalization as a phenomenon, emphasizing
changes in the perception of time and space, see Heba Shams, "Law in the Context of 'Globalisation':
A Framework of Analysis" (2001) 35 Int'l Lawyer 1589.
16 Ibid.; for a review of the evolution of meta-state institutions, see generally David Held et al., Global
Transformations:Politics, Economics and Culture (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).
17 See e.g. Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004);
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture,
vol. I (Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1996).
is My treatment here draws on a fuller exposition of thcse issues in my working paper on globalization,
see Frank J. Garcia, "Globalization, Global Community, and the Possihility of Global Justice" (2005)
Boston College Law School Research Paper No. 56, online: SSRN <http://papers.ssm.eom/sol3/
papers.c fm?abstraetid=661564>.
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Globalization is bringing about at the global level the conditions that make justice both
possible and necessary at the domestic level, conditions which Rawls calls the
"circumstances ofjustice."' 9 Rawls lists five circumstances: a moderate scarcity of resources,
a shared geographical territory, a capacity to help or harm each other, and, on a subjective
level, people are both non-altruistic, and hold conflicting claims. 2° These circumstances make
it rational to cooperate for our mutual self-interest, and necessitate the elaboration of
principles ofjustice, and the creation of institutions through which to allocate the fruits of
such cooperation.
The key point is that globalization is bringing about the same circumstances of justice at
the global level which Rawls described at the domestic level. To begin with, there is, of
course, the same basic scarcity of resources at the global level. Through globalization, people
are increasingly competing for the same resources on a global scale in a shared territory: our
planet. That they are non-altruistic and assert conflicting claims over these resources does
not need to be argued because it is a truism.
Because of globalization, we also now have the capacity to help and to harm each other
at the global level as well, to an unprecedented degree. Through globalization, we
increasingly find that we have the capacity to respond effectively to the needs and concerns
of others beyond our boundaries, through the transnational mobilization of information,
power, capital, or public opinion. 2' Because of globalization, we also increasingly find that
our state's policies, and our own political and consumer choices, are influencing the lives of
others in direct and dramatic ways. The globalization of markets means that in many cases,
we are directly profiting from the economic and social conditions in other parts of the world.
Thus, we have the capacity to harm each other as well, thereby fulfilling the basic conditions
outlined by Rawls.
Together, these global circumstances of justice offer one kind of argument for a global
society, making justice both possible and necessary at the global level. A second, more
ambitious argument is that globalization is going further than creating merely global society,
and is creating global community, at least to a limited degree.
B. GLOBALIZATION AND COMMUNITY
For communitarians, concepts of justice depend upon the prior existence of social
relationships, which create obligations of justice by defining the principles, subjects, and
19 For an overview of circumstanees ofjustice, see John Rawls, A Theory ofJustice (Cambridge: Harvard
Belknap, 1971) at 126-30.
20 Ibid.
21 Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999)
at 9. Even David Miller, a communitarian critic of global justice, acknowledges that the "prosaic
observation that the rich countries now have the technical capacity to transfer large quantities of
resources to the poorer countries" makes a primafacie case that such transfers have become morally
obligatory: see David Miller "The Limits of Cosmopolitan Justicc" in David R. Mapel & Tcrry Nardin,
cds., International Society: Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998)
164 at 165-67.
(2007) 45:2
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objects ofjustice.Z: In other words, society is more than the field of application for justice:
it creates justice itself. No society means no justice.
To be more precise, communitarians speak of the absence of community at the global level
as something deeper than mere society. Communitarians maintain that although we may
share a common humanity and mutual interests, we do not share obligations ofjustice unless
we already share certain kinds of social relations, usually identified with the nation, and
generally expressed in terms of shared traditions, practices, and understandings.23 Put another
way, communitarians might acknowledge the existence of some kind of global society,
consisting of associations for mutual self- interest, but as something distinguishable from true
"community," which requires "something more," and justice is reserved for the latter.
That something more is generally expressed as a sense of common purpose, or solidarity.24
For Michael Walzer, it is a society's shared life that determinesjustice, and not the other way
around. Justice therefore requires a prior community, in which all relevant distributive
decisions take place according to shared traditions, practices, and understandings ofjustice.
In Walzer's words, "[j]ustice is rooted in the distinct understandings of places, honors, jobs,
things of all sorts, that constitute a shared way of life."25
This is where globalization, once again, comes in. Essentially, my argument is that
globalization itself is contributing to the emergence of such shared traditions, practices, and
understandings at the global level, making global justice possible even for communitarians.
One basis for global community is the globalization of knowledge. Through globalization,
we know so much more, immediately and intimately, about the plight of people in other parts
of the world. One specific type of shared knowledge important to globalization is the
growing recognition of the risks we share as human beings on this planet, and our shared
interest in addressing those risks. In this sense, globalization is creating what has been called
a "community of risk."26
Such knowledge satisfies a basic requirement for community: that we have the capacity
to know one another's needs, concerns, and preferences. This kind of knowledge is the basis
for creating solidarity, that leap of the moral imagination which says that your concerns are
my concerns.
This community of knowledge and risk is also increasingly becoming a community of
shared traditions, practices, and understandings; which grow, both spontaneously and
22 See e.g. Miller, supra note 14; Walzer, supra note 14. The communitarian critique of cosmopolitan
global justice is only part of its larger critique of liberal justice, and liberalism generally. For a summary
of this critique, see Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism" (1989)
99 Ethics 852.
23 Communitarian theorists differ on the precise nature of these necessary relations, and in general this
aspect of communitarianism is under-theorized. See Buchanan, ibid at 867.
24 See ibid at 856-57, where Buchanan argues that community requires more than association, it also
requires shared common ends.
25 See Walzer, supra note 14 at 314.
26 Dirk Messner, "World Society - Structures and Trends" in Paul M. Kennedy, Dirk Messner & Franz
Nuscheler, eds., Global Trends & Global Governance (London: Pluto Press, 2002) 22 at 24.
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institutionally, out of our perception of shared needs and interests, our capacity to help and
to harm, and our awareness of each other's plight. In short, these perceptions stem from our
understanding of globalization as interlocking our fates.
C. GLOBALIZATION, MARKETS, AND META-STATE INSTITUTIONS
This essay focuses on two particular aspects of contemporary globalization: markets and
the meta-state institutions that regulate them. These are particularly relevant to a discussion
of the implications of the Softwood Lumber dispute, and particularly indicative of global
shared practices and understandings and the emergence of global community, at least in their
respective realms.
1. MARKET SOCIETY AS A SET OF SHARED PRACTICES
To the extent that globalization is creating a global market society, this in itself is a shared
practice or set of practices, albeit quite complex, that contributes to a community of interests.
The advanced capitalist form of market society practiced by the most developed countries
is not, of course, implemented in identical ways in all market societies.27 Nevertheless, a
market society has certain attributes: the need for bureaucratic regulation, recognition of
private property, and functioning civil courts, to name a few, which, by virtue of their
significant spill-over effects, contribute to the formation of shared interests among
participants.28 Not the least of these is an interest in developing institutions that supplement
and mitigate the rigors of capitalism, compensating the "losers" through some form of wealth
transfer.
2. SHARED UNDERSTANDING OF THE NEED FOR META-STATE INSTITUTIONS
Perhaps the strongest force for, and evidence of, an emerging global limited community
involves our shared need to look to institutions beyond the state in order to frame an adequate
social response to many of the problems and challenges we face. In other words, the need for
increased global governance is itself a shared understanding, and the reality of global
governance by its nature constitutes a shared practice. The prominent role of meta-state
institutions in the Softwood Lumber dispute is a particularly apt illustration of this trend.
Globalization's many aspects are together pushing us towards increased cooperation at the
meta-state level. According to Rawls's account of the circumstances ofjustice, our response
to these circumstances is to enter into systems of social cooperation for mutual advantage.
Through this cooperation we create the "basic structure," the institutions we employ to
allocate resources and opportunities, and which thereby directly affect our life prospects.29
By leading us to create new institutions and shift responsibility for many social allocations
27 Indeed, markets have been touted on instrumental grounds precisely because they can facilitate efficient
transfers among people who do not share conceptions of the good: see Jon Mandle, "Globalization and
Justice" (2000) 570 The Annals of the American Academy Political and Social Science 126 at 130.
28 See e.g. Don Slater & Fran Tonkiss, Market Society (Cambridge: Polity Prcss, 2001) at 92-116: the
authors survey a range of institutions which markets require and in which they are embedded.
29 Rawls, supra note 19.
ALBERTA LAW REVIEW (2007) 45:2
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to the meta-state level, globalization is creating a global basic structure.3" Social allocation
today is increasingly conducted through a complex partnership, consisting of states and their
constituent units, international organizations, and non-state actors through mechanisms such
as the market, all of which are regulated or established through international law.3" Through
globalization we find ourselves in precisely the sort of cooperative venture for mutual
advantage that is the subject ofjustice, and allocating the fruits of social cooperation (trade
opportunities, for example) through meta-state institutions such as the WTO, theNAFTA, and
the European Union (EU).
This move to the meta-state level could be seen as merely tending towards the creation of
global society, which, in the communitarian view, does not entail global community.
However, I would like to suggest three ways in which this shift towards the meta-state level
has profound communitarian consequences.
First, this shift indicates that the communitarian assumption of bounded distributive
communities no longer holds at the nation-state level, and thus necessitates a shift to a higher
or more inclusive level of community in which all relevant distributive decisions are taken
- the global level. Walzer describes the political community of justice as one "capable of
arranging [its] own patterns of division and exchange, justly or unjustly."32 When a
community is no longer capable of fixing its own patterns of division and exchange, it is no
longer sufficient to analyze the justice of that community soley in reference to itself.3 3 In
other words, unable to fix its own distributions entirely itself, it is not capable of delivering
its own justice. We must therefore look to that further level of institutions affecting that
community's distributions, and consider its justice.
This process is precisely the effect of globalization. 34 From a distributive perspective,
globalization is revealing domestic society to be an incomplete community, incapable of
securing the overall well-being of its members by itself, leading to a higher level of
30 For an interesting analysis of the issues presented by the possibility of a global basic structure, see
Simon Caney, "The Global Basis Structure: Its Nature and Moral Relevance" (Paper presented at the
Chicago Annual Meeting ofthe American Politieal Science Assoeiation, delivered at the Palmer House
Hilton, Chicago, 2 September 2004), online: all academic <http://www.allacademie.com/meta/p58933_
index.html>.
31 The many players and institutions involved in the Softwood Lumber dispute - trade associations,
national courts, regional institutions, and multi-lateral institutions - dramatically illustrate this point.
All of these institutions, both within their individual jurisdietions and in some sense together, were
involved in allocative decision making coneerning fair or unfair lumber practices in the North American
lumber industry. See cases cited in supra note 2; see also Jones, supra note 21 at 9: "The institutions
and quasi-formal arrangements affeeting persons life prospects throughout the world are increasingly
international ones." Note that here the authorcites as examples international finaneial institutions, multi-
national corporations, the G-8, and the WTO.
32 Supra note 14 at 3 1.
33 This argument also resembles the point raised earlier about the tenability of Rawls's assumption of self-
contained national distributive communities that he provides in his analysis of domestie justice. See
Rawls, supra note 19.
34 See Alberto Tita, "Globalization: A New Political and Economic Space Requiring Supranational
Governance" (1998) Journal of World Trade 47 at 49, where the author argues that globalization leads
to internal pressures on states "traditional maeroeconomic [policy tools] ... are becoming less and less
capable of being determined at a national level by democratically elected governments."
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community as part of group efforts to secure well-being.35 This is exactly the pattern we see
in the Softwood Lumber dispute, as participants are forced by evolving international legal
obligations and the changing nature of the market itself to seek definitive resolution of this
issue beyond the national courts level, and instead at the level of meta-state institutions. In
a similar sense, the many anti-globalization protests focused on multilateral institutions
indicates the growing awareness that these institutions are increasingly constraining
allocative decision making at the national level, as well as themselves engaging in positive
distributive functions, through the allocation of trade benefits, critical currencies, and
development aid, for example.
Second, the fact that globalization is forcing us to look to international institutions such
as the NAFTA and the WTO for global policy solutions has a community-building effect as
well. The role played by common institutions sharing a common language in building polities
out of disparate peoples has long been recognized in domestic politics as "nation-building. 36
For example, the United States reinforces its shared identity as a nation when it looks to the
federal level for resource allocations and policy responses, as in the case of natural disasters
or security crises. Similarly, the tendency in North America and Europe to look at least in
part to meta-state institutions for responses to global social and environmental problems
reflects a shared understanding that such institutions play an increasingly prominent role in
formulating or channeling social policy decisions and orchestrating social welfare responses,
and that few states can act without them on any important social issue. 37 Even the many
recent anti-globalization protests, by turning up on the doorsteps of the same international
institutions again and again, emphasize the emergence of this shared understanding.
Third, this shift to meta-state institutions represents the emergence of a shared
understanding with respect to regulating global social conflict. In domestic communities, one
answer to the problem of conflict is to change the level of analysis to "understandings about
understandings," or "shared public cultures."38 When responding to the fact of social conflict,
particularly conflict over what are purportedly "shared" understandings, communitarians
shift the level of analysis to a secondary set of practices and understandings, a system for
managing conflicts over understandings and their application.39
This tendency suggests that communitarians are actually linking justice to a kind of shared
institutional culture, rather than a true community of shared primary beliefs.4n If so, this shift
35 See also Robert P. George, "Natural Law and International Order" in Mapel & Nardin, supra note 21
at 54.
36 Will Kymlicka, "Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective" in David Miller & Sohail
Hashmi, eds., Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives (Princeton: Prineeton University
Press, 2001) 249 at 256.
37 The public nature of the Softwood Lumber dispute has contributed to a broader shared understanding
of how regional trade and integration have linked U.S. and Canadian social policy and even politics. See
Gagn6, supra note 3 at 700-701.
38 Walzer, supra note 14 at 313, suggests that disagreements over the meaning of social goods, cases in
which a given social understanding is controvcrsial, trigger a sort of "second order" set of
understandings concerning how disputes are to expressed, managed, and adjudicated.
3 Ibid.
40 Perhaps what communitarians are identifying when they speak of the common good is really a
commitment to this second-order set of understandings about disputes: the rules about rules, the publie
culture.
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to meta-state institutions has profound consequences for global justice. In the development
of new forms of meta-state institutional governance, a new form of shared understanding, or
rules about rules, at the global level is also being developed. When global social relations
involve conflicts between incomplete national communities of justice over allocative
decisions, globalization bumps us up a level, invoking a new shared understanding that the
meta-state level is the place to resolve this conflict, according to new understandings
regarding appropriate distributions at the global level. Insofar as these global practices
deepen and extend, we see stronger shared traditions and practices of global social policy
formation and allocative decision making.
Disputes like the Softwood Lumber dispute and the NAFTA panel process generally, can
thus be seen as forming part of the meta-state level of shared understandings concerning
conflicting global claims. Both the dispute and the institutional processes that managed it are
part of an emerging community involving Canada and the U.S. If so, then the dispute is in
some important sense an internal one, which by its very nature reinforces and is constitutive
of community.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBALIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND FOR THE FAIR TRADE/FREE TRADE DEBATE
I am not suggesting that at this point in our history global social relations in toto form the
sort offully-established political community that communitarians point to in domestic social
relations as their exemplar. In my view, however, globalization is creating a third alternative:
global society understood as containing "limited" degrees of community in specific
functional areas.4' If we disaggregate the notion of community, it is possible to see that
globalization is creating certain elements of community at the global level, such as
knowledge ofinter-connectedness and the circumstances ofthe other, as well as creating true
community in certain areas of global social relations, such as humanitarian relief and
transboundary economic relations by establishing that degree of social bond necessary to
support justice. This means that global society taken as a whole may not rise in all cases to
the level of community that communitarians prefer, but has enough elements of community,
and contains enough pockets of community, to support an inquiry into justice in at least in
some areas of global social relations.
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW OR GLOBAL PUBLIC LAW?
If we look at international law as not the law of nations, but as the law of an emerging
global community, then we see two fundamental gaps: the absence of effective mechanisms
for global wealth transfers at the scale necessary to support the global basic package, and the
Moreover, the trend is towards increasing community. See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, "The
'International Community': Facing the Challengc of Globalization" (1998) 9 Eur. J. Int'l L. 266. The
authors list Rwanda and Somalia as cxamples of a weak solidarity which can suggest that the concept
of global community is either half-full, or half-empty. They decidc it is half-full, asking "aftcr all, who
would have cared - and how - a hundred ycars ago" (at 276).
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absence of effective political representation or voice at the global level.42 How to arrive at
this, and in the process complete the transformation from international law to global public
law, will require a profound re-examination of core international legal doctrines and
institutions such as boundaries, sovereignty, legitimacy, citizenship, and the territorial control
of resources.
As a starting point, it is necessary to re-think the role of territorial political boundaries.
Territorial boundaries now serve as the frame on which we hang various concepts of
distributivejustice, such as citizenship and the territorial control ofresources, that profoundly
influence the lives of all affected individuals. By privileging citizens over non-citizens in
terms of access to basic rights, the political boundary of citizenship dramatically affects our
quality of life on the basis of one of thc most arbitrary aspects of our natural condition: the
place we are born. In the words of one commentator, "citizenship in western liberal
democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal privilege - an inherited status that greatly
enhances one's life chances."43
Citizenship thus illustrates how the current society of states model of international law
permits territorial boundaries to function at the global level as one of the main obstacles to
the delivery of basic rights. lf global community is possible, and as 1 have argued, emerging,
then the discretion given states to use boundaries as primary determinants of global justice
must be reconsidered.44 A model for the international delivery of the basic package - a
concept of effective global citizenship if you will - in which the accident of birthplace, or
the vagaries of naturalization law, do not fundamentally affect each person's life prospects,
needs to be devcloped.
In order to do so, global public law needs to tackle distributive issues both between and
within states. The society of states model placed the question ofjustice outside the realm of
international law. Globalization means that the problem of inequality is a ccntral problem of
global social relations, in the same way it is a central problem of justice at the domestic
level.45
What should the role of the state be in a global public order? Global community demands
a new view of this role, in which the state no longer holds a monopoly on the delivery of
42 Jay R. Mandle and Louis Ferleger refer to this as the need for institutional mechanisms for compensation
and control, two fundamental elements of the regulation of global market society: see Jay R. Mandle &
Louis Ferleger, "Preface" (2000) 570 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 8 at 16.
43 Joseph H. Carens, "Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders" in Will Kymlicka, ed., The Rights
of Minority Cultures (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 33.
44 As things stand, there is a pernicious anomaly: free movement of capital but no free movement of
persons, which could be seen as a deliberate attempt to keep labour eosts from equalizing. A global
economie space demands something approaching the free movement of persons, subject to some notion
of carrying eapacity or assimilation rate. The very idea conjures images of unsupportable mass
migrations, which are not inevitable, nor are they the necessary result of changes in border policies. The
primary reason for such shifts would be economic inequality, a subject that poses a central challenge to
global public law.
45 For a discussion arguing for a central role for inequality in contemporary international economic
relations, see generally Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality andJustice: Toward a Liberal Theory ofJust
Trade (Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational, 2003).
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basic public goods, but must nevertheless play a central role in such delivery, including that
of the guarantor of last resort. 6 However, this does not mean that global institutions must be
modeled on domestic institution, a sort of world state. Rather, in normative terms, global
institutions must bejustifiable according to the same principles applied in domestic political
theory, whatever their shape. Their legitimacy can no longer rest entirely on their creation
by states along duly authorized treaty lines, but will require some increased form of public
participation, reflecting normative principles of political theory in the same way that
domestic institutions must.
4 7
B. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
As a field, international economic law needs to move beyond the question of if or whether
international economic law is a form of global governance and ask instead how and to what
end are we governing? It is no accident that international economic law is the site for
addressing questions of institutional design, legitimacy, and distributive justice. This is so
because regulatory globalization is central to globalization as a whole, and because it is in
economic relations that thc strongest international organizations today are found.
I. GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
If international cconomic law is a core part of the global basic structure for delivering
economic justice, it needs to be analyzed, negotiated, and structured with reference to
appropriate normative principles. Is international economic law facilitating the kinds of
wealth transfers that global justice might require? Is it allocating social goods in a
normatively defensible manner? Meeting this challenge has several implications.
First, normative principles that are appropriate for application at the global level in a
context ofpluralism need to be identified. There is increasing interest within political theory
on thc question of global justice, at both the private party/transaction level ofjustice, and at
the level of public or structural principles ofjustice.48
To complement this, there needs to be more work within the legal academy applying
principles of justice to economic law institutions. There is an increasing interest in the
normative aspects of the WTO.49 The basic work on trade andjustice should be extended to
other international economic institutions such as the World Bank and thc International
Monetary Fund, in order to develop a comprehensive theory of justice in international
economic relations. °
46 Indeed, Manuel Castells has argued that globalization is bringing about a new form of nation-state, the
"network state," whose principle duty is to successfully manage on our behalfthis web ofnetworks. See
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 2
(Maiden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1997) at 243-73.
47 See Lea Brilmayer, Justifying International Acts (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
48 See e.g. Frank J. Gareia, "Why Trade Law Needs a Theory of Justice" (2006) 100 Ameriean Society of
International Law Proceedings 214 at 379, nn. 6-9.
49 Ibid. atnn. 10-12.
50 See e.g. Frank J. Garcia, "Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions" (2007) 10 J. Int'l. Econ.
L. 461; Robert Hockett, "From 'Mission Creep' to Gestalt-Switch: Justice, Finance, the IFIs, and
Globalization's Intended Beneficiaries" (2005) 37 Gco. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 167 at 179-81.
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2. THE EFFECTIVENESS AND LEGITIMACY
OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
This converges with the need for increased attention to the legitimacy and effectiveness
aspects of international economic law institutions. As lawyers, we have a special
responsibility when it comes to such multilateral institutions, which are created to deliver
basic public goods independent of nationality, even if still often administered through
national units. The central questions in the Softwood Lumber dispute about how thcse
various levels of institutional process should best interact with, defer to, or supersede each
other, illustrate the kinds of questions we as lawyers are best equipped to address,
particularly insofar as we understand them in the largest possible context.
I have argued in this essay that this context is globalization, and within this context such
questions should be seen as the working out of meta-state governance systems for an
emerging global community. If this is so, then our political tradition requires that the
legitimacy of such institutions no longer rest entirely on their creation by states along duly
authorized treaty lines, but depend upon some increased form of public participation,
reflecting normative principles of political theory in the same way that domestic institutions
must.5 This is part of the constitutionalism debate currently carried out in international
economic law.52
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, I have argued that in global relations today we see, both inter-subjectively
and at the regulatory level, the constitutive elements of a limited global community
emerging. Globalization itself is a process of creating a new global identity, consisting of
shared understandings, practices, and traditions capable of supporting obligations ofjustice.
Members of this new global space are increasingly aware of each other's needs and
circumstances, increasingly capable of effectively addressing these needs, and increasingly
contributing to these circumstances in the first place. They find themselves involved in the
same global market society, and together these members look to the same organizations,
especially those at the meta-state level, to provide regulatory approaches to addressing
problems of global social policy. These organizations, in addressing such needs, are involved
in allocating the benefits and burdens of social cooperation, such as rights, opportunities,
privileges, membership, resources, and activities that have been traditionally understood in
the domestic sphere to make justice both relevant and necessary.
All of this is not to argue that global community has emerged fully formed, with the
richness and force of the national community. However, taken together, these developments
allow us to begin to speak in important ways of limited degrees of community, or "spheres
51 See Brilmayer, supra note 47.
52 On the constitutional and law-making function of trade institutions, and their shortcomings in this
regard, see Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, "Constitutionalism and International Organizations" (1997) 17 Nw.
J. Int'l L. & Bus. 398; but see Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's 'Constitution'
and the Discipline of International Law" (2006) 17 Eur. J. Int'l L. 647, where it is argued that
Petersmann's account is descriptively inaccurate and normatively undesirable.
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ofjustice"53 to borrow Walzer's phrase, with respect to different issues, institutions, or sets
of social relations within the global social space. Thus we can speak of limited global
community in the economic sphere, as embracing that level of community necessary to
support relations ofjustice, even if it does not manifest that level of community necessary
to speak of global community in the fullest communitarian sense.
Returning to the Softwood Lumber dispute, a globalization perspective allows us to see
that the many private and institutional participants in the dispute, by pursuing their private
agendas and public mandates, have been doing far more than resolving a particular trade
dispute.54 They have been participating in, creating, and defining a new trans-border
community, and elaborating the meta-state institutions that both mediate, and help constitute,
such a community. In this sense, the dispute is not about ensuring that trade law is "fair" for
the U.S. or for Canada, but that it is fair as the public law of an emerging transboundary
community.
53 Supra note 14.
54 See supra note I.
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